Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, collectively known as the government-sponsored enterprises or GSEs, are the two most important institutions in the American housing finance system, together purchasing or guaranteeing approximately 70 percent of all new residential mortgage originations in a typical year. Fannie Mae, the Federal National Mortgage Association, was established in 1938 as a government entity to purchase FHA-insured loans and provide liquidity to the mortgage market, and it was privatized in 1968 to reduce the federal budget footprint. Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, was established in 1970 as a competitor to Fannie Mae to provide a secondary market for conventional loans originated by savings and loan institutions. Both entities were created with a public mission to provide liquidity, stability, and affordability to the housing finance system, and they were structured as privately owned corporations with shares traded on the stock exchange, but with a charter from the federal government that granted them certain privileges and imposed certain obligations. The dual nature of the GSEs, as private profit-seeking corporations with a public mission, has been the source of both their effectiveness and their controversies throughout their history.
The business model of the GSEs involves the purchase of conforming residential mortgage loans from originating lenders, the securitization of those loans into mortgage-backed securities, and the guarantee of the timely payment of principal and interest on those securities. The GSEs generate revenue primarily from the guarantee fees that they charge for guaranteeing the securities, which are expressed as a percentage of the outstanding loan balance and are paid by the borrowers through the interest rate on their mortgages. The guarantee fee covers the credit risk that the GSEs assume, the operational costs of the securitization and guarantee functions, and a return on the capital that the GSEs must hold to support their guarantee obligations. The GSEs also maintain retained portfolios, in which they hold mortgage-backed securities and whole loans as investments, earning the spread between the yield on the assets and the cost of funding, though the retained portfolios have been significantly reduced since the conservatorship and are subject to caps imposed by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
The securitization mechanics of the GSEs are the core of their operations and the mechanism through which they provide liquidity to the mortgage market. When a lender originates a conforming loan and sells it to a GSE, the GSE assembles the loan with other similar loans into a pool and issues mortgage-backed securities that represent claims on the cash flows from the pool. The GSE guarantees the timely payment of principal and interest to the security holders, which means that if a borrower in the pool defaults, the GSE continues to make the scheduled payments to the security holders and absorbs the credit loss. The guarantee transforms the credit risk of the underlying loans into the credit risk of the GSE, which is considered very high quality due to the implicit government support that the GSEs receive, and the guaranteed securities are priced at yields that are only slightly higher than Treasury yields of comparable duration. The securitization process provides the originating lender with immediate cash to fund new originations, and it provides investors with a high-quality fixed-income security that is liquid and standardized.
The single-security initiative, which was launched in 2019, unified the securitization platforms of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into a single security known as the Uniform Mortgage-Backed Security, or UMBS, which is issued by both GSEs and trades in a single, fungible market. Prior to the initiative, Fannie Mae issued mortgage-backed securities under its own brand and Freddie Mac issued participation certificates under its own brand, and the two types of securities traded at slightly different prices due to differences in pool characteristics, trading conventions, and market liquidity. The Uniform Mortgage-Backed Security eliminated these differences by creating a single security with standardized terms and trading conventions, and it increased the liquidity and depth of the GSE securitization market by combining the pools of both GSEs into a single trading universe. The initiative was one of the most significant structural reforms of the GSE securitization market in the post-crisis era, and it has improved the efficiency of the secondary market and reduced the financing costs for borrowers by increasing the liquidity of the securities that back their loans.
The credit risk transfer programs of the GSEs are a post-crisis innovation that has fundamentally changed the way the GSEs manage the credit risk of the loans they guarantee. Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, the GSEs held all of the credit risk of their guarantee portfolios on their own balance sheets, which proved to be a catastrophic vulnerability when the housing market collapsed and the credit losses exceeded the GSEs capital. In response, the GSEs developed credit risk transfer programs that sell a portion of the credit risk on newly acquired loans to private investors, through a combination of reinsurance transactions, structured note issuances, and other risk-sharing structures. The credit risk transfer programs have transferred hundreds of billions of dollars of credit risk to private investors, reducing the exposure of the GSEs and by extension the taxpayers who back the GSEs through the conservatorship. The programs have also created a new market for mortgage credit risk, with a diverse investor base that includes insurance companies, hedge funds, asset managers, and other institutional investors who are willing to assume the credit risk of conforming loans in exchange for the risk-adjusted returns that the credit risk transfer transactions offer.
The pricing of guarantee fees by the GSEs is a critical determinant of mortgage rates for conforming loans, as the guarantee fee is a component of the interest rate that the borrower pays. The guarantee fee includes a base fee that covers the expected credit losses on the loan pool, an operational cost component that covers the GSEs administrative expenses, and a capital charge that provides a return on the capital that the GSEs must hold against the guaranteed loans. The Federal Housing Finance Agency, as the conservator and regulator of the GSEs, has the authority to set the guarantee fee levels, and the agency has adjusted the fees over time to balance the objectives of maintaining the safety and soundness of the GSEs, providing a return to the taxpayer for the government support, and ensuring that mortgage credit remains affordable for borrowers. The guarantee fee has been a subject of policy debate, with some arguing that the fees are too high and constrain mortgage affordability, while others argue that the fees are too low and do not adequately compensate the taxpayers for the risk that the government support entails.
The conforming loan underwriting standards that the GSEs establish are among the most important determinants of who can obtain mortgage credit in the United States, as the GSEs standards effectively set the baseline for the conventional mortgage market. The GSEs publish detailed selling guides that specify the eligibility requirements for loans they will purchase, including the minimum credit score, the maximum debt-to-income ratio, the maximum loan-to-value ratio, the property eligibility requirements, and the documentation standards that must be met. The selling guides are extensive documents that are updated regularly to reflect changes in market conditions, regulatory requirements, and the GSEs risk appetite, and they serve as the reference for virtually every conforming loan originated in the United States. The GSEs also operate automated underwriting systems, Fannie Mae Desktop Underwriter and Freddie Mac Loan Product Advisor, which apply the selling guide standards to individual loan applications and provide the underwriting decision that determines whether the loan is eligible for GSE purchase.
The affordable housing mission of the GSEs is a central element of their charter and a significant influence on their operations and their impact on the mortgage market. The GSEs are required by their charter to provide liquidity to the mortgage market for low- and moderate-income borrowers and for properties in underserved communities, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency sets annual affordable housing goals that measure the GSEs performance in serving these markets. The affordable housing mission has led the GSEs to develop specialized loan programs with more flexible underwriting standards for low- and moderate-income borrowers, including programs with lower down payment requirements, lower credit score thresholds, and reduced mortgage insurance costs. The mission has also led the GSEs to invest in community development financial institutions, to provide financing for affordable rental housing through their multifamily operations, and to support housing counseling and homebuyer education programs that help borrowers prepare for sustainable homeownership.
The conservatorship of the GSEs, which was established in September 2008 during the financial crisis, is one of the most significant and unresolved issues in the American housing finance system. The conservatorship placed the GSEs under the direct control of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, with the Treasury Department providing a financial backstop through preferred stock purchase agreements that committed up to $200 billion to each GSE to cover any capital deficits. The GSEs have been in conservatorship for more than 18 years, far longer than was originally anticipated, and the conservatorship has fundamentally altered the GSEs operations, their capital structure, and their relationship with the government. Under the conservatorship, the GSEs have delivered all of their profits to the Treasury as dividends on the preferred stock, leaving them with capital buffers that have been steadily declining, and the future structure of the GSEs, including whether they will be recapitalized and released from conservatorship, remains the subject of ongoing policy debate and administrative action.
The multifamily mortgage operations of the GSEs are a significant and often underappreciated component of their business, providing liquidity to the rental housing market through the purchase and securitization of apartment building loans and other multifamily mortgage products. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are the largest sources of multifamily mortgage credit in the United States, together financing a substantial share of all multifamily loan originations, and their multifamily operations have been profitable and relatively low-risk compared to their single-family operations. The multifamily operations are subject to caps set by the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which limits the volume of multifamily loans that the GSEs can purchase each year, with exceptions for loans on affordable housing properties and other mission-driven categories. The multifamily operations are a critical source of financing for the rental housing that houses more than a third of American households, and the continued availability of GSE multifamily financing is essential for the construction and preservation of rental housing across the country.
The technology infrastructure of the GSEs has evolved significantly in the post-crisis era, with both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac investing heavily in data analytics, automated underwriting, loan quality assessment, and securitization technology. The GSEs automated underwriting systems, Desktop Underwriter and Loan Product Advisor, process millions of loan applications per year and provide the underwriting decisions that enable the rapid and consistent application of the GSEs standards across the origination market. The GSEs have also developed sophisticated loan quality assessment tools that analyze loan files for compliance with the selling guide requirements, and they use data analytics to monitor the performance of their guarantee portfolios and to identify trends and risks that may require action. The technology investments have improved the efficiency of the mortgage origination process, have reduced the incidence of loan defects and repurchase demands, and have enhanced the ability of the GSEs to manage the risks of their guarantee portfolios at a granular and data-driven level.
The GSEs influence on mortgage pricing extends beyond the guarantee fee to include the pricing of the mortgage-backed securities themselves, which are the benchmark for conforming mortgage rates. The yield on GSE mortgage-backed securities is the primary reference point for the interest rate that originators offer to borrowers, and the spread between the MBS yield and the Treasury yield of comparable duration is a key indicator of mortgage market conditions. The spread is influenced by a variety of factors, including the prepayment speed of the underlying loans, the supply of new MBS issuance, the demand from investors including the Federal Reserve, and the general level of interest rate volatility. When the spread narrows, mortgage rates fall relative to Treasury yields, and when the spread widens, mortgage rates rise. The GSEs influence the spread through their securitization volume, their credit risk transfer pricing, and their communications with the investor community, and the efficient functioning of the MBS market is essential for the transmission of broader market conditions to borrower-level mortgage rates.
The role of the GSEs in the 2008 financial crisis is a critical chapter in their history and a formative event in the development of the post-crisis housing finance system. The GSEs suffered massive losses on their guarantee portfolios and their retained portfolios, driven primarily by the deterioration of loans originated during the 2005-2007 period, when the GSEs had lowered their underwriting standards to compete with the private-label market and had acquired large volumes of high-risk loans. The losses exceeded the GSEs capital, rendering them insolvent and triggering the conservatorship that placed them under government control. The crisis revealed the vulnerability of the GSEs business model, in which a thin layer of capital supported a massive guarantee portfolio, and it demonstrated the systemic risk that the GSEs posed to the broader financial system due to their size, their interconnectedness, and their implicit government guarantee.
The housing goals and duty to serve obligations that the Federal Housing Finance Agency imposes on the GSEs are mechanisms through which the GSEs are directed to serve borrowers and communities that have historically been underserved by the conventional mortgage market. The housing goals measure the percentage of GSE purchases that finance loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers, loans in low-income and minority census tracts, and loans in rural areas, and the GSEs are expected to meet the target percentages that the agency sets. The duty to serve obligation requires the GSEs to develop plans for serving three specific underserved markets, including manufactured housing, affordable housing preservation, and rural housing. The housing goals and the duty to serve obligation are controversial, with supporters arguing that they are essential for ensuring that the GSEs fulfill their public mission, and critics arguing that they may encourage the GSEs to lower underwriting standards in pursuit of the goals.
The future of the GSEs is the most consequential unresolved question in the American housing finance system, as the conservatorship that has governed the GSEs since 2008 is widely acknowledged to be a temporary arrangement that was never intended to last as long as it has. The options for the future of the GSEs include recapitalization and release from conservatorship as independent entities, which would restore them to private operation with enhanced capital and regulatory oversight, and various forms of structural reform that could involve merging the two GSEs, creating new entities to compete with them, or replacing them with a new government guarantee structure. Each option has implications for the pricing and availability of mortgage credit, the management of credit risk, the role of the government in the housing finance system, and the interests of the various stakeholders including borrowers, lenders, investors, and taxpayers. The resolution of the GSE question will shape the American housing finance system for decades to come, and it is one of the most important policy decisions facing the federal government in the housing finance arena. This article is for educational purposes only and does not constitute a loan offer or financial advice. Borrowers should consult a licensed mortgage professional for guidance specific to their individual situation.

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Publisher & Mortgage Strategist
Ebonie Beaco is the founder and publisher of Mortgage & Real Estate Strategist Magazine. She is a licensed mortgage loan officer (NMLS #2389954) affiliated with NEXA Lending (NMLS #1660690), providing lending services in multiple states. She covers mortgage strategy, lending programs, and real estate investing.
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