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GSE Reform and the Future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Policy Debates and Proposals

An educational guide to the ongoing debate over the reform of the government-sponsored enterprises, examining the history of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the conservatorship, the range of reform proposals, and the implications for the mortgage market and borrowers

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have operated under federal conservatorship since 2008, and the question of how to restructure the government-sponsored enterprises is one of the most significant unresolved issues in housing policy. This educational guide examines the history of the GSEs, the conservatorship, the range of reform proposals, and the implications for the mortgage market.

Ebonie Beaco, Publisher & Mortgage Strategist
Ebonie Beaco

Mortgage Strategist | Senior Mortgage Loan Officer

Nov 6, 2026 8 minutes
GSE Reform and the Future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Policy Debates and Proposals

The government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac occupy a central and unique position in the United States housing finance system, and the question of how to restructure these entities, which have operated under federal conservatorship since September 2008, is one of the most significant and most protracted unresolved issues in American housing policy. The GSEs, which were created by Congress to provide liquidity and stability to the residential mortgage market, purchase mortgages from lenders, package them into mortgage-backed securities, and guarantee the payment of principal and interest on those securities to the investors who hold them, thereby creating a deep and liquid secondary market for conforming mortgages that lowers the cost of mortgage credit and expands the availability of mortgage financing. The conservatorship, which was established by the Federal Housing Finance Agency at the height of the financial crisis to prevent the insolvency of the GSEs and to maintain the flow of mortgage credit, was intended to be temporary, but it has now lasted for more than 18 years, and the resolution of the conservatorship and the restructuring of the GSEs remain the subject of active policy debate among lawmakers, regulators, industry stakeholders, and housing policy analysts.

The history of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is essential to understanding the current reform debate, as the GSEs evolved from their origins as government-created entities with a public mission to their status as shareholder-owned corporations with an implicit government guarantee, and the contradictions of this hybrid structure contributed to the risks that materialized in the financial crisis. Fannie Mae, originally the Federal National Mortgage Association, was created in 1938 as a government agency to purchase FHA-insured mortgages and to provide liquidity to the mortgage market, and it was privatized in 1968 as a shareholder-owned corporation with a government charter, creating the original government-sponsored enterprise. Freddie Mac, originally the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, was created in 1970 as a shareholder-owned corporation to provide a secondary market for conventional mortgages and to provide competition for Fannie Mae. The two GSEs grew to dominate the conforming mortgage market, with their combined mortgage-backed securities outstanding exceeding 5 trillion dollars by the mid-2000s, and their combined retained portfolios of mortgage assets growing to approximately 1.7 trillion dollars before the financial crisis.

The business model of the GSEs before the conservatorship combined two distinct activities, the guarantee business, in which the GSEs guaranteed the mortgage-backed securities that they issued and earned a guarantee fee for the credit risk that they assumed, and the portfolio business, in which the GSEs purchased and held mortgage-backed securities and other mortgage assets on their own balance sheets, earning the spread between the yield on the assets and the cost of the debt that funded them. The portfolio business, which was facilitated by the GSEs ability to issue debt at rates that reflected the implicit government guarantee of their obligations, was a source of significant interest rate risk and credit risk, and the portfolios were a primary contributor to the losses that the GSEs suffered during the financial crisis, as the mortgage assets in the portfolios deteriorated in value and as the credit losses on the guarantees exceeded the GSEs capital. The reform debate has focused significant attention on the portfolio business, with a broad consensus among reform advocates that the portfolio business should be eliminated or significantly restricted in any post-conservatorship structure, and the conservatorship itself has already reduced the retained portfolios through the requirement that the GSEs reduce their portfolio holdings to a specified target level.

The conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which was established on September 7, 2008, by the Federal Housing Finance Agency under the authority of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, placed the GSEs under the direct control of the FHFA as conservator, with the objective of preserving the GSEs assets, restoring them to financial soundness, and maintaining the flow of mortgage credit. Under the conservatorship, the GSEs have continued to operate as the primary providers of secondary market liquidity for the conforming mortgage market, purchasing and securitizing mortgages, guaranteeing the mortgage-backed securities, and setting the underwriting and eligibility standards for the loans that they purchase. The conservatorship has also involved the injection of approximately 191 billion dollars of taxpayer capital from the Treasury Department to cover the GSEs losses, and the GSEs have subsequently paid approximately 300 billion dollars in dividends to the Treasury, exceeding the original capital injection, though the dividend payments have not reduced the outstanding Treasury preferred stock investment and have not been applied to the redemption of the government investment. The terms of the conservatorship, including the senior preferred stock agreement that governs the dividend payments and the warrants that the Treasury holds for approximately 79.9 percent of the GSEs common stock, are central to the reform debate, as the resolution of the conservatorship requires the unwinding of these arrangements.

The guarantee fee, which is the fee that the GSEs charge for guaranteeing the mortgage-backed securities that they issue, is a critical element of the GSE reform debate, as the guarantee fee is the primary determinant of the cost of the GSE guarantee and a key driver of the mortgage rates that borrowers pay on conforming loans. The guarantee fee, which is typically expressed in basis points and which is incorporated into the interest rate that the borrower pays, has been adjusted several times during the conservatorship, with the increases used both to build the GSEs capital reserves and to generate revenue for the Treasury, and the current guarantee fee level is significantly higher than the pre-conservatorship level. The reform debate includes the question of the appropriate level of the guarantee fee in a post-conservatorship structure, with the consideration that the guarantee fee must be sufficient to compensate the guarantor for the credit risk that it assumes and to build an adequate capital buffer, but not so high as to unnecessarily increase the cost of mortgage credit for borrowers. The guarantee fee is also a tool that has been used to fund broader policy objectives, including the temporary fee increase that was used to fund the payroll tax cut extension in 2011, and the use of the guarantee fee for non-housing policy purposes has been criticized as an inappropriate burden on mortgage borrowers.

The capital requirements debate is central to the GSE reform discussion, as the amount and the type of capital that the GSEs or their successors must hold to support their guarantee obligations is a primary determinant of the safety and the soundness of the post-conservatorship system and of the cost of the GSE guarantee. During the conservatorship, the GSEs have operated with minimal capital, as the senior preferred stock agreement requires the GSEs to reduce their capital to zero by the end of each year and to remit any excess capital to the Treasury, and the GSEs have effectively operated on the full faith and credit of the federal government. The FHFA has proposed capital requirements for the GSEs that would require them to hold significant capital against their guarantee obligations in a post-conservatorship structure, and the proposed requirements, which are based on a risk-based capital framework and a minimum leverage requirement, would require the GSEs to hold capital that is commensurate with the credit risk that they assume and with the systemic importance of their activities. The capital requirements are a critical design choice in the reform, as the requirements must be sufficient to protect against the credit losses that could materialize in a severe economic downturn but not so onerous as to make the GSE guarantee prohibitively expensive and to restrict the availability of mortgage credit.

The recapitalization and release proposal, commonly known as recap and release, is one of the principal reform approaches that has been advanced in the policy debate, and it involves the recapitalization of the GSEs through the retention of earnings and the raising of private capital, followed by the release of the GSEs from conservatorship as fully private companies with a government guarantee of their mortgage-backed securities. The recap and release approach, which has been advocated by certain investor groups that hold GSE equity and by some conservative policy organizations, would restore the GSEs to their pre-conservatorship status as shareholder-owned companies, though with significantly higher capital requirements and with a reform of the business model that would eliminate or restrict the retained portfolio business. The recap and release approach has been criticized by other reform advocates who argue that it would recreate the pre-conservatorship structure that contributed to the financial crisis, with the same implicit government guarantee and the same conflicts between the shareholder profit motive and the public mission, and who argue that a more fundamental restructuring of the housing finance system is necessary to prevent a recurrence of the risks that the pre-conservatorship GSE model created.

The utility model proposal is another principal reform approach, and it involves the restructuring of the GSEs as regulated utilities that provide the securitization and guarantee function on a single-family basis, with the rates and the operations regulated by the FHFA or another federal regulator, and with the returns on capital capped at a level that is appropriate for a regulated utility. The utility model, which has been advocated by certain housing policy organizations and by some academic analysts, is designed to address the concerns about the GSE profit motive and the implicit guarantee by transforming the GSEs from profit-maximizing corporations into regulated entities that provide a essential infrastructure function at a regulated rate of return, similar to the regulation of electric utilities and other natural monopolies. The utility model would eliminate the retained portfolio business and would focus the GSEs exclusively on the securitization and guarantee function, with the guarantee fee set by the regulator at a level that covers the credit risk, the operating costs, and a regulated return on capital, and the utility model is designed to provide the stability and the public orientation of a government function while maintaining the private capital that supports the guarantee obligations.

The privatization proposal, which involves the full privatization of the GSE guarantee business without any government backing, is a reform approach that has been advocated by some conservative policy organizations and by some free-market economists who argue that the government should not be involved in the guarantee of mortgage credit and that the mortgage market should operate entirely on private capital and private risk pricing. The privatization approach, which would involve the spin-off of the GSE guarantee business as private mortgage insurance companies or as private securitization platforms, would represent the most fundamental restructuring of the housing finance system, as it would eliminate the government-sponsored secondary market that has been the foundation of the conforming mortgage market for decades. The privatization approach has been criticized by other reform advocates who argue that the private mortgage market, without the government-sponsored secondary market, would be unable to provide the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage at a competitive cost and that the private market would be more volatile and more pro-cyclical than the government-sponsored system, restricting the availability of mortgage credit during economic downturns and exacerbating the housing market cycle. The privatization debate reflects a fundamental philosophical divide about the appropriate role of the government in the housing finance system, and the resolution of this divide is one of the central challenges of the GSE reform process.

The congressional reform efforts, which have been pursued through various legislative proposals over the years since the conservatorship was established, have not yet produced a comprehensive GSE reform law, despite the significant attention that the issue has received from the relevant congressional committees and from the successive administrations. The legislative proposals that have been advanced, including the Johnson-Crapo proposal, the Corker-Warner proposal, and the more recent proposals from the House Financial Services Committee, have shared certain common elements, including the elimination of the GSEs in their current form, the establishment of a new government guarantee of mortgage-backed securities that is backed by private capital in a first-loss position, and the maintenance of the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage as a core product of the reformed system. The failure of the legislative reform efforts to reach enactment reflects the complexity of the reform, the diversity of the stakeholder interests, the political polarization that has made bipartisan agreement on complex financial regulatory issues difficult, and the fact that the conservatorship, while intended to be temporary, has functioned as a stable and effective framework for the GSE operations, reducing the urgency of the reform effort.

The administrative reform efforts, which have been pursued by the FHFA and the Treasury Department under the authority that the conservatorship provides, have made some progress toward the restructuring of the GSEs, including the development of the capital requirements framework, the consolidation of certain GSE operations, and the modification of the senior preferred stock agreement to allow the GSEs to retain some earnings to build capital. The administrative reform path, which does not require congressional action, is limited in its scope, as the fundamental restructuring of the GSEs, including the elimination of the GSEs or the establishment of a new government guarantee structure, requires legislative authority that the conservatorship does not provide. The administrative reforms that can be pursued within the conservatorship framework include the further development of the capital requirements, the further operational consolidation of the GSEs, the continued refinement of the underwriting and eligibility standards, and the preparation of the GSEs for the eventual exit from the conservatorship, whether through a legislative reform or through an administrative process that is within the authority of the FHFA and the Treasury.

The impact of the GSE reform on the mortgage market and on borrowers is a central consideration in the reform debate, as the GSEs are the primary providers of secondary market liquidity for the conforming mortgage market, and the structure of the post-conservatorship system will determine the cost, the availability, and the characteristics of conforming mortgage credit. The reform proposals that maintain a government guarantee of the mortgage-backed securities, with private capital in a first-loss position, are designed to preserve the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage and the broad availability of conforming mortgage credit, while the proposals that eliminate the government guarantee would likely result in a more limited and more expensive conforming mortgage market, with a greater reliance on adjustable-rate mortgages and on private mortgage insurance. The reform will also affect the pricing of the conforming mortgage, as the guarantee fee in the post-conservatorship system, which will reflect the cost of the private capital that supports the guarantee and the regulator-mandated capital requirements, will determine the spread between conforming mortgage rates and the underlying Treasury yields, and the reform will affect the access to conforming mortgage credit for different borrower segments, as the underwriting standards and the pricing adjustments in the post-conservatorship system will determine the borrower populations that can access the conforming mortgage market.

The international comparisons of housing finance systems provide useful context for the GSE reform debate, as the housing finance systems of other developed countries offer alternative models for the provision of mortgage credit and for the role of the government in the mortgage market. The housing finance systems of Canada, Australia, and several European countries include some form of government involvement in the mortgage market, either through a government guarantee of mortgage-backed securities, as in Canada, through a government-provided mortgage insurance program, as in Canada and Australia, or through government-sponsored mortgage institutions, as in several European countries. The international experience suggests that the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage, which is a distinctive feature of the United States housing finance system and that is enabled by the GSE securitization and guarantee platform, is relatively rare in other countries, where the adjustable-rate mortgage is the dominant product and where the government involvement in the mortgage market takes different forms. The international comparisons provide evidence on the trade-offs among different housing finance structures, but they do not provide a definitive answer to the question of the optimal structure for the United States, as the housing finance system must be designed in the context of the specific characteristics of the United States housing market and the United States political and regulatory environment.

The single-securitization platform, known as the Uniform Mortgage-Backed Security or UMBS, is a concrete operational reform that has been implemented during the conservatorship and that represents a meaningful step toward the consolidation and the modernization of the GSE infrastructure, regardless of the eventual resolution of the conservatorship question. The UMBS, which was launched in 2019 by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under the direction of the FHFA, replaced the separate mortgage-backed securities that each GSE had previously issued with a single, uniform security that is issued by both GSEs and that is backed by the combined collateral of both enterprises, creating a deeper and more liquid market for the GSE mortgage-backed securities and reducing the operational costs and the complexity of the securitization process. The UMBS represents a significant achievement of the conservatorship, as it demonstrates the potential for the operational consolidation of the two GSEs to produce efficiencies and market improvements that would not have been achievable under the pre-conservatorship competitive structure, and the platform provides a foundation for the further consolidation that could be pursued in a post-conservatorship structure, whether through the merger of the GSEs into a single entity or through the continued operation of the consolidated platform under whatever governance structure is ultimately adopted. The UMBS also addresses one of the long-standing inefficiencies of the two-GSE structure, which was the fragmentation of the mortgage-backed securities market into two separate pools that were backed by the same type of collateral but that traded at slightly different prices and that required separate operational infrastructure, and the consolidation into a single security eliminates this fragmentation and creates a more efficient and more competitive market for the conforming mortgage-backed securities.

In conclusion, the reform of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the resolution of the conservatorship are among the most significant unresolved issues in American housing policy, and the resolution will have a profound impact on the structure of the housing finance system, the cost and availability of mortgage credit, and the stability of the mortgage market for years to come. The range of reform proposals, from the recap and release to the utility model to the privatization, reflects the diversity of views on the appropriate role of the government in the housing finance system and the appropriate balance among the objectives of mortgage market stability, mortgage credit affordability, taxpayer protection, and private market discipline. The failure of the congressional reform efforts to date, and the limitations of the administrative reform path within the conservatorship framework, have meant that the GSEs continue to operate in a limbo that was intended to be temporary but that has become a permanent feature of the housing finance landscape. For mortgage market participants and housing policy observers, the understanding of the GSE reform debate and the range of reform proposals is essential for anticipating the potential changes to the housing finance system and for preparing for the transition to a post-conservatorship structure, whenever and in whatever form that transition ultimately occurs. This article is for educational purposes only and does not constitute legal, financial, or policy advice. Readers should consult the relevant government agencies and qualified professionals for guidance specific to their individual situation.

Ebonie Beaco — Mortgage Strategist

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Editorial Disclosure: This article is published by Mortgage & Real Estate Strategist Magazine for informational and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal, tax, financial, or investment advice. Mortgage and real estate professionals should consult appropriate experts and verify current program guidelines before making decisions based on this content.

Sources & References

Sources Last Verified: November 8, 2026

Ebonie Beaco, Publisher & Mortgage Strategist
Ebonie Beaco

Publisher & Mortgage Strategist

Ebonie Beaco is the founder and publisher of Mortgage & Real Estate Strategist Magazine. She is a licensed mortgage loan officer (NMLS #2389954) affiliated with NEXA Lending (NMLS #1660690), providing lending services in multiple states. She covers mortgage strategy, lending programs, and real estate investing.

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